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THE PITFALLS OF INTERNATIONAL INTEGRATION: 
A COMMENT ON THE BUSH PROPOSAL AND ITS AFTERMATH 
 
Reuven S. Avi-Yonah 
The University of Michigan1 
 
 
In January 2003, the Bush Administration proposed a new system for taxing 
corporate dividends, under which domestic shareholders in U.S. corporations would not 
be taxed on dividends they received, provided the corporation distributed these dividends 
out of after-tax earnings (the “Bush Proposal”). The Bush Proposal was introduced in 
Congress on February 27, 2003. Ultimately, however, Congress balked at enacting full-
fledged dividend exemption. Instead, in the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation 
Act of 2003 (“JGTRRA”) as enacted on May 28, 2003, a lower rate of 15% was adopted 
for dividends paid by domestic and certain foreign corporations 2, and the capital gains 
rate was likewise reduced to 15%. Significantly and in stark contrast to the original Bush 
proposal, under JGTRRA the lower rate for dividends and capital gains does not depend 
on any tax being paid at the corporate level. 
This comment will focus primarily on the international aspects of both the Bush 
Proposal and JGTRRA. I will not lay out the proposal or the law in any detail. Instead, I 
will ask whether either the Bush Proposal or JGTRRA make sense from an economic 
efficiency perspective when the international implications are taken into account. I will 
leave to others the question of whether either the Bush Proposal or JGTRRA are sensible 
                                                 
1 I would like to thank Steve Bank, Michael Barr, David Bradford, Bill Gale, Michael Graetz, David Hasen 
and Emil Sunley for helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper, and David Lenter for excellent 
research assistance. 
 
2 The lower rate applies to dividends from “qualified foreign corporations”, i.e., corporations in countries 
with which we have a tax treaty that the Treasury deems satisfactory.   
2
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ways to stimulate the economy (for discussion of the effect of the 2001 tax cuts see 
Shapiro and Slemrod 2001; Shapiro and Slemrod 2002). I will also omit any discussion 
of the distributive effects of either the Bush Proposal or JGTRRA, which have been 
extensively discussed elsewhere (e.g., Tax Policy Center, 2003; Burman, Gale and 
Orszag 2003).  
 
1. The Bush Proposal and JGTRRA as methods of achieving integration. 
 
Both the Bush Proposal and JGTRRA can be seen as ways of achieving full or partial 
integration of the corporate and shareholder tax through a reduced tax rate on dividends. 
Achieving integration has been a long held aim of many tax academics, and was 
proposed by the first Bush Administration and by the American Law Institute (Graetz and 
Warren 1998; Treasury 1992; McLure 1979; but see Kwall 1990). In this section, I will 
evaluate the traditional arguments for integration, and then assess how the Bush Proposal 
and JGTRRA fulfill the stated goals of integration. 
Historically, there have been three reasons advanced for countries to adopt 
corporate/shareholder integration and thus overcome biases in the classical system 
(Graetz and Warren, 1998):  
1. Under the classical system, there is a bias to conduct business in non-corporate 
forms, to avoid double taxation of corporate income (although this is mitigated 
if the individual rate exceeds the corporate rate, since in corporate form the 
individual tax can be deferred). 
3
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2. Under the classical system, there is a bias to avoid dividend distributions and 
instead retain earnings, thus avoiding the double tax (this bias is exacerbated 
when the individual rate exceeds the corporate rate); 
3. Under the classical system, there is a bias in favor of capitalizing corporations 
with debt (producing deductible interest) rather than equity (producing non-
deductible dividends). 
None of these arguments are completely convincing, which may be a reason why 
the US has maintained the classical system from 1936 to 2003, and indeed strengthened it 
in 1986 with the repeal of the “General Utilities” doctrine, which enabled corporations to 
avoid corporate tax on a distribution of appreciated assets (for other reasons see Bank, 
2002; Arlen & Weiss 1995).  First, the alleged bias against the corporate form is 
mitigated to the extent the top individual rate exceeds the corporate rate, as it generally 
did until JGTRRA, and by the absence of strong provisions to prevent retentions in the 
domestic context.3  
In addition, under current rules, the classical system applies primarily to large, 
publicly traded corporations, while small, closely held businesses are able to avoid the 
double tax even if they are in corporate form for non-tax purposes (by choosing to be 
taxed as S corporations or by incorporating as Limited Liability Companies, which are 
treated as pass-through entities for tax purposes). It is doubtful if there is sufficient 
substitutability between the two forms of business for the double tax to create much 
deadweight loss from the bias toward non-corporate form. Most estimates of the 
deadweight loss from this bias are quite low. For example, Goolsbee (2002) found that an 
4
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increase in the corporate tax rate by 10% reduces the corporate share of firms by 5-10% 
and the corporate share of sales and employment by 2-6%. Goolsbee concluded that 
“[t]he impact of tax rates is an order of magnitude larger than previous estimates… and 
suggests a larger DWL from corporate taxation, but is still relatively modest.”  As 
Goolsbee says, previous empirical studies found much lower DWLs (contrary to the 
theoretical predictions of high DWLs in the model employed by Gravelle and Kotlikoff, 
1989). The double tax is a price large businesses have to pay for access to the public 
equity markets and the liquidity that accompanies such access.  
Finally, to the extent that the corporate tax can be shifted to consumers or to 
labor, the bias disappears, and the Treasury’s 1992 integration study and many others 
have suggested that considerable shifting can take place (Graetz & Warren, 1998; see 
also Mulligan, 2002; Fullerton & Metcalf, 2002; Judd, 1985; Homma, 1981; Grieson, 
1975; Feldstein, 1974, all refining the classic work of Harberger, 1962, who predicted a 
shift primarily to other capital). The bias reappears if non-corporate businesses can 
likewise shift the individual tax burden, but it seems plausible that the shifting potential 
of large multinationals is larger than that of small, closely held businesses (Fullerton & 
Metcalf 2002; Harberger 1995; Mutti & Grubert 1985). 
Second, the bias in favor of retentions is reduced when (as both before and after 
JGTRRA) the individual rate on dividends is not significantly higher than the corporate  
rate.  In addition, this bias was mitigated before JGTRRA by the ability of corporations to 
redeem shares from shareholders at the favorable capital gains rate through share 
repurchases, and by the fact that numerous shareholders are tax exempt or corporate (and 
                                                                                                                                                 
3 The accumulated earnings tax, IRC 531-537, and the personal holding company tax, IRC 541-547, are 
both weak, the former because the IRS has to prove that earnings were improperly accumu lated, and the 
5
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thus do not pay a full tax on dividends). Even when the tax rate on dividends is the same 
as that on capital gains (as under JGTRRA), capital gain transactions may still be 
preferred for the ability to offset basis. That is why many US corporations have adopted 
structured redemption programs addressed to their taxable individual shareholders. Other 
corporations retain all their earnings, but it is not clear that this is primarily tax motivated 
(corporations used to pay dividends under the same rules in the past). Admittedly, more 
corporations were paying dividends in 2003 than in previous years, but this trend began 
before JGTRRA (Norris, 2003), and again it is not clear that this is primarily tax 
motivated. Finally, there is an unresolved debate among economists whether the dividend 
tax is capitalized into the price of the shares. If it is, then the retention bias applies only to 
new equity, but new equity is unlikely to pay dividends for non-tax reasons (Fuest and 
Huber 2000; Boadway and Bruce 1992; Bradford 1981).4 
Third, the bias in favor of debt and against equity is a general problem of the 
income tax, which should not be addressed only in the corporate tax area (Warren, 1993; 
Bradford 1981; Stiglitz 1973). Moreover, even to address it just for corporations it is 
necessary to make dividends not exempt, but rather deductible, a form of integration that 
is never adopted (in part because it would automatically extend integration to foreign and 
tax-exempt shareholders; see Grubert and Mutti, 1994). If integration takes the normal 
forms of imputation or dividend exemption, there is still a difference in treatment 
between interest and dividends that can be manipulated. For example, if interest is taxed 
at the corporate level but dividends are not, clientele effects will still exist (tax exempts 
will hold bonds and taxable shareholders stock, and taxable investors will purchase 
                                                                                                                                                 
latter because it only applies to a narrow class of corporations earning mostly passive income. 
6
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stocks and then use derivatives to construct a portfolio that is economically equivalent to 
an investment in bonds (Warren, 1993)). Neither of these problems arises if both interest 
and dividends are deductible or (as under the Treasury’s CBIT (Comprehensive Business 
Income Tax) model, Treasury, 1992) both non-deductible, but neither of these seems to 
be a practical option politically. 
Neither the Bush Proposal nor JGTRRA adequately addresses all of these biases. 
Under the Bush Proposal, the first bias (against the corporate form) is addressed by 
taxing corporate profits at 35% at the corporate level and non-corporate profits at 35% at 
the individual level, but if the corporate tax can be shifted more easily than the individual 
tax (e.g., because multinational corporations can credibly threaten to shift jobs overseas), 
a bias in favor of the corporate form arises.  JGTRRA does nothing to address this bias 
because the lower rate for dividends does not depend on corporate tax being paid, and 
therefore if the corporate tax can be sheltered a bias is created in favor of corporate 
investment (taxed at 15%) vs. non-corporate investment (taxed at 35%). 
Under the Bush Proposal, the second bias (against distributions) is reduced 
because dividends are exempt, but capital gains transactions are still taxed differently (at 
20% with an offset for basis that is increased by retained earnings).  Under JGTRRA, this 
bias is retained to the extent dividends are taxed, and capital gains transactions are still 
preferred for the ability to offset basis. Moreover, to the extent the dividend tax is 
capitalized into the price of shares, no gain in efficiency can be expected from reducing 
the dividend tax on old equity, in which case the only outcome is a windfall for existing 
shareholders. 
                                                                                                                                                 
4 This “new” view of dividend taxation also implies that the distortion against the corporate form should 
not be large, which is consistent with Goolsbee (2002) and related work cited above. 
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Finally, neither the Bush Proposal nor JGTRRA adequately address the bias in 
favor of debt, because under both, equity is still treated differently than debt and this 
distinction can be manipulated as explained above.  
In sum, it is unclear whether there are significant domestic efficiency gains 
associated with either the Bush Proposal or JGTRRA. The presumed gains (Treasury, 
2003) depend on assumptions regarding the incidence of both the corporate tax and the 
dividend tax that most economists regard as unproven (Burman, Gale and Orszag, 2003).  
  
2. The international aspects of the Bush Proposal and JGTRRA. 
 
Even if one accepts the validity of all the biases generated by the classical system 
set out above, all of them need to be offset by the countervailing biases created by 
integration in the international context. From a theoretical perspective, two situations 
need to be considered: when the source country is integrationist and the residence country 
classical, and when the source country is classical and the residence country 
integrationist. In the following, I will first lay out the theoretical problem, and then apply 
it to the Bush Proposal and to JGTRRA. 
 
a. Classical residence country and integrationist source country. 
 
If a portfolio investor residing in a classical country invests in shares of a 
company of an integrationist country, the resulting bias depends on the form of 
integration. If the source country grants integration in the form of dividend exemption, 
the classical country investor would not benefit since the classical country would tax him 
on the dividend without allowing a foreign tax credit for underlying corporate taxes.  A 
8
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domestic investor in the source country would be subject only to the corporate tax, while 
the classical country investor would be subject to the corporate tax, any foreign 
withholding tax on dividends, and the residual classical country tax.  
If the source country grants integration by way of imputation credits, the key issue 
is whether such credits are extended to foreign investors (by treaty or otherwise). If (as is 
typical) the credits are not extended to foreigners, a domestic investor in the source 
country would only be subject to tax at his or her individual rate, while the classical 
country investor would be subject to tax at the corporate level, any withholding tax on 
dividends, and the residual classical country tax. Whether the combination of these taxes 
exceeds the source country tax on domestic investors depends on how high the source 
country rates are (it is conceivable, for example, that a combined tax on the classical 
country investor of 60% would be matched by the single level source country tax on a 
domestic investor). 
If imputation credits are extended to classical country investors, a different bias 
arises. In that case, both domestic source country and classical country investors in a 
foreign corporation would be taxed the same by the source country, but the cost of 
imputation credits to classical country investors would be borne by the source country, 
while any tax on the dividend would be collected by the classical country. From a 
classical country perspective, moreover, there would be a bias in favor of investing in 
source country corporations and against investing in classical country corporations, since 
only dividends from the former would carry the imputation credits. Such a bias would not 
be eliminated by the classical country taxing the dividends in full, since the investor 
9
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would still receive an imputation credit check from the source country not available for 
her classical country investment. 
 
b. Classical source country and integrationist residence country   
 
If the integrationist residence country grants integration by way of dividend 
exemption, presumably the exemption would apply to dividends from the classical 
country as well as from domestic corporations  (this is true for many dividend exemption 
countries but not for others, and is generally true under JGTRRA but not under the Bush 
Proposal). In that case, a bias is created in favor of foreign investors in classical source 
country companies, since foreign investors would be exempt from tax on the dividend 
(unless a classical country withholding tax applies or is designed to offset this problem, 
but such taxes are generally reduced by treaty or avoided by other devices). By contrast, a 
classical country domestic investor would be taxable on the dividends in full. 
If the foreign country grants integration by way of imputation credits, there will 
be no credits available for a foreign investor who invests directly in a classical country 
company. In that case, there will be a bias in favor of the foreigner investing in her own 
country’s domestic corporations.  This bias may be partially eliminated if credit is given 
for classical country taxes to a domestic portfolio investor in a domestic company with 
classical country source income. But, similar to the case of a dividend exemption, that 
would create a bias in favor of foreign investors in such companies over classical country 
investors in a domestic classical country corporation. 
10
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Thus, from a theoretical perspective, as long as there are both classical and 
integrationist countries in the world, integration creates biases that do not arise in a world 
with only classical countries (Zee, 2002; Avi-Yonah, 1996; Harris, 1996; Ault, 1992). 
Theoretically, the biases could also be eliminated in a world in which all countries 
practiced integration and extended its benefits to foreign investors and investments, but 
this seems a very unrealistic scenario, which is certainly not fulfilled under present 
conditions. 
 
c. The Bush Proposal and JGTRRA. 
 
Under the Bush Proposal, dividend exemption only applied to dividends from 
domestic corporations, which were exempt if the corporation’s income was fully taxed. 
This was true even if the dividend derived from US corporations with foreign source 
income (through a branch or subsidiary), since both direct foreign taxes and withholding 
taxes could be counted as equivalent to US taxes. Dividends from foreign corporations, 
on the other hand, were fully taxed, with a credit available only for foreign withholding 
taxes and for US taxes on effectively connected income. Significantly, US portfolio 
investors investing in foreign corporations with US source income would not get a credit 
even for US withholding taxes or branch profit taxes. The Bush Proposal thus created a 
very significant bias against investing in foreign corporations. In the context of an open 
economy, this bias could well lead to greater welfare losses to US portfolio investors than 
their gains from domestic integration. 
11
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JGTRRA does better in this regard since it applies the lower 15% rate to 
dividends from foreign corporations resident in treaty countries approved by the IRS, as 
well as from domestic corporations. This still creates a bias against investing in other 
foreign countries, which is strange since JGTRRA makes no effort to ensure that a 
corporate tax is levied on domestic US corporations (presumably, the restriction was 
applied to, e.g., Barbados because of the lack of corporate tax there).5  Nevertheless, 
JGTRRA creates another bias in terms of the sourcing of equity capital to US 
corporations, since they would have an incentive to raise such capital domestically (15% 
tax on dividends) rather than from foreign investors in classical countries or integrationist 
countries that do not extend dividend exemption to foreign investments (US withholding 
tax at 15% plus residual residence country tax). In addition, corporations in classical 
countries may be biased in favor of raising capital from US investors rather than from 
domestic investors. 
Thus, both the Bush Proposal and JGTRRA illustrate the theoretical point made 
above: In a world with both integrationist and classical countries, adopting integration 
leads to biases that could well result in larger efficiency costs than the putative domestic 
efficiency gains, especially if (as under the Bush Proposal and under the practice in many 
integrationist countries (Vann 2003; Ault 1997; Harris 1996)) integration is not extended 
to foreign investments.   
   
3. Conclusion 
 
                                                 
5 It may be easier to determine which countries have a zero tax rate than which corporations do not pay 
much corporate tax, but other integrationist countries do both (Vann, 2003). 
12
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From a theoretical perspective, there seems to be no reason to assume that 
the biases created by integration from an international perspective are less 
important than the biases created by the classical system from a domestic 
perspective.6 Further empirical work is needed on this issue, expanding the initial work 
by Grubert and Mutti (1994). This is particularly important since the international biases 
may be gaining in importance as cross-border portfolio investment grows, while (as 
discussed above) there are reasons to doubt the importance of the latter.7 This is the 
reason why many countries (e.g., Germany and the U.K.) have recently been restricting 
integration (Vann, 2003).8  If the whole world reverted to the classical system, the 
international biases would be eliminated. 
Nevertheless, in the foreseeable future, some countries will continue to grant 
integration, while others are likely to maintain a classical system. In that situation, it is 
necessary to make a choice between the international biases described above, which is 
similar to the choice between capital import neutrality (treating all investors in the source 
country alike) and capital export neutrality (treating all investment opportunities to a 
resident investor alike). Since most of the empirical evidence continues to suggest that 
the elasticity of the demand for capital is greater than the elasticity of the supply of 
capital, most economists would support a continued preference for capital export 
neutrality (neutrality in the allocation of investments) over capital import neutrality 
                                                 
6 The former biases may be mo re important in the short run from a global efficiency perspective, while the 
latter may be more important from a domestic efficiency perspective. In the long run, however, the two 
tend to converge for open economies. 
7 Admittedly, conducting empirical work that yields clear results is very difficult, and depends crucially on 
the details of the actual integration proposal. Compare Grubert and Mutti (1994) with Treasury (1992 and 
2003). While the Bush Proposal remains theoretical, the effects of JGTRRA need to be studied in practice. 
8 In the EU case, part of the motivation was an unwillingness to extend imputation credits to residents of 
other EU countries as required by the European Court of Justice, but this is a global trend (Vann, 2003), not 
just a European one.   
13
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(neutrality in the allocation of savings) (But see Desai and Hines (2003) for a different 
view, which applies primarily to direct investment). 
If one prefers capital export neutrality, this suggests that integrationist source 
countries should not extend integration benefits to foreign investors (since that would 
violate CEN while maintaining CIN). This is consistent with current practice. When the 
integrationist country is the residence country, integration benefits should be extended to 
investments in classical source countries. This can be done by granting integration credits 
for taxes paid to the source country, either through a domestic corporation (which is 
common) or even through a foreign corporation (less common but possible- it is 
equivalent to granting the indirect foreign tax credit to portfolio US investors, which 
would raise many difficult administrative issues). A simpler solution, however, is to 
exempt dividends from both domestic and foreign corporations, as is partially achieved 
under JGTRRA (but emphatically not under the Bush Proposal). This would still leave a  
bias in the form of a dividend withholding tax imposed by the source country (plus a 
branch profits tax if the investment is through a foreign corporation), but in the case of 
the US, portfolio investors can usually avoid the dividend withholding tax. 9 
Thus, the JGTRRA method of integration (partially exempting dividends from 
both domestic and foreign corporations) is superior from an international perspective to 
the Bush Proposal. The JGTRRA result preserves CEN as far as the US is concerned, but 
there is still a bias in favor of investing in domestic corporations to the extent foreign 
source countries levy a withholding tax on dividends, a bias that could be eliminated by 
the source country.  In addition, foreign investors in US corporations are still 
                                                 
9 For example, by entering into a total return equity swap with a U.S. investment bank, since dividend 
equivalent payments under such swaps are not subject to withholding tax (Avi-Yonah and Swartz, 1997). 
14
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disadvantaged compared to US investors, either because of US withholding taxes on 
dividends (which the US can and should abolish, see Avi-Yonah 1996) or because their 
country of residence taxes dividends (which the US can do nothing about). 
However, the best solution from a US perspective to the above biases is to revert 
to the classical system, as the case against it is shaky (at best). Under current law, this 
will occur automatically in 2013. In that case, we should consider abolishing the 
withholding tax on dividends (and the branch profits tax) so as to do our part to reduce 
the bias against investors from integrationist countries.      
15
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